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Recent scandals in the nonprofit sector have once again called into 
question the issue of nonprofit governance. Who is governing these 
organizations and are they doing so appropriately? Who is regulating 
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and what law applies—federal, state, or both? The one thing that is 
certain is that clarity is needed.1 True to form, the egregious behavior 
of some of those serving on the boards of directors of large 
organizations has brought these issues back into the spotlight, raising 
questions for regulators and the general public about the validity of 
these and other organizations and the truth of their stated missions. 
While most assume that clear laws dictate the behavior of those 
entrusted with the care of charitable nonprofit organizations, some 
scholars question just how clear these laws are and whether 
overstepping by the Internal Revenue Service in this area may be 
causing confusion.2 Others believe that while nonprofit governance 
                                                      
1 Ed Connors, Your Nonprofit Board as Reality Show: Trump Foundation Offers a 
Cautionary Tale, NONPROFIT Q. (June 21, 2018), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/06/21/your-nonprofit-board-as-reality-show-
trump-foundation-offers-a-cautionary-tale/ [https://perma.cc/9MLZ-24B8]; David 
A. Fahrenthold, Trump Foundation Admits to Violating Ban on ‘Self-Dealing,’ New 




[https://perma.cc/PP6X-V7CX]; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., 
Attorney General Underwood Announces Lawsuit Against Donald J. Trump 
Foundation and Its Board of Directors for Extensive and Persistent Violations of 
State and Federal Law (June 14, 2018) https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-
general-underwood-announces-lawsuit-against-donald-j-trump-foundation-and-its 
[https://perma.cc/D5FY-H4D2]; Andrea Fuller, Pistachio Billionaires’ Foundation 
Lends Millions to Business Associates, WALL ST. J., (June 28, 2018) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nut-company-owners-foundation-lends-millions-to-
business-associates-1530178200 [https://perma.cc/PQ52-ZTUD]; Henry Cordes & 
Matthew Hansen, Goodwill Omaha Executive Pay: An Investigative Series,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Oct. 26–Dec. 3, 2016), 
https://dataomaha.com/media/news/2016/goodwill/ [https://perma.cc/YY46-
W7C3]; Ruth McCambridge, Nebraska AG: Board Members Convinced Goodwill 




2 See generally, e.g. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-31-101 to -1708 (providing nonprofit 
laws for South Carolina); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6a-101 to -1705 (West 2018) 
(providing nonprofit laws for Utah); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2008) (providing model nonprofit laws as suggested adoption by states); 
NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2014) (giving in-depth discussion of nonprofit 
statutes and case law and discussing evolving areas of debate and uncertainty); 
Amy Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of the IRS to Determine 
Tax-Exempt Status According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of Judicial 
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was once the purview of the states alone, the federal government has 
inappropriately preempted oversight in this area.3 Charitable nonprofit 
organizations incorporate under state law and receive tax exemption in 
accordance with federal law,4 resulting in a system that has sometimes 
complicated legal matters. Yet, under both state and federal law, 
nonprofits must function to carry out their organizational missions for 
the good of the public5 Recently, the Trump Foundation, the Resnick 
Foundation, and Goodwill Omaha, all designated as charitable 
nonprofit organizations by the Internal Revenue Service, have been the 
focus of scandal and review. Taken together, they represent many of 
the challenges that are at the core of this governance issue.6 A review 
of the facts in these and other situations will help clarify the issue and 
help focus on potential resolution.
In Parts I-III, this Article will begin by discussing nonprofit 
governance, a board of director fiduciary duty, and federal, state, and 
common law as they pertain to nonprofit governance. It will set out 
different theories for whether the IRS has, in fact, overstepped its 
authority in this area by regulating nonprofit governance matters and 
discuss whether there should be more cooperation between the IRS and 
states attorneys general. Part IV will summarize three recent situations 
as examples of this current dilemma.
More specifically, in Part V, this Article will review the claim by 
many scholars that by regulating nonprofit governance through IRS 
forms 1023 and 990, the IRS has overstepped its authority; it will also 
                                                      
Deference, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117 (2014) (discussing IRS power, judicial review, 
and general uncertainty in nonprofit law as seen in Bob Jones University v. United 
States); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury 
Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558 (2011) (discussing uncertainty in 
current IRS regulatory authority, generally).
3 James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545 (2010); Bruce R. Hopkins, IRS 
Regulation of Nonprofit Governance: A Critique, 30 TAX’N EXEMPTS 4 (2018).
4 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). This source does not state that charitable organizations 
are incorporated under federal law, but is the federal law which regulates charitable 
institutions.
5 See id.; see also CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 87.
6 Petition, New York v. Donald J. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018), 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/court_stamped_petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GW3-XZKF]; DOUGLAS J. PETERSON, NEB. ATT’Y GEN., NEB.
DEP’T JUST., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, INC. AND 
GOODWILL SPECIALTY SERVICES, INC. (2018)
HTTPS://AGO.NEBRASKA.GOV/SITES/AGO.NEBRASKA.GOV/FILES/DOC/2018.06.26%20
GOODWILL%20PUBLISHED%20REPORT.PDF [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2MG5-FTWN];
CORDES & HANSEN, supra note 1; FULLER, supra note 1.
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explore the theory that the IRS has gone even farther by regulating 
through the private benefit doctrine.7 It will ask if the IRS has 
overstepped and, if it has, whether it has done so out of necessity 
because state attorneys general are overworked, understaffed, and 
generally unable to keep up in this area. It will also ask whether, as one 
scholar advocates, dual oversight is not only legal but actually more 
effective.8 Further, in Part VI, this Article will compare similarities 
between nonprofit and for-profit governance regulation to glean any 
useful lessons, and in Part VII, it will explore policy considerations 
surrounding these governance issues. Finally, in Part VIII, it will 
suggest that perhaps dual jurisdiction with established roles and 
mandatory information sharing may work best given the many nuances 
in the sector and the political nature of the offices tasked with this 
oversight.
II. DUAL REGULATION
In recent years, as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has 
increased its monitoring of charitable nonprofits in the governance 
realm, questions have arisen as to what, if any, authority the IRS has 
in this area. While the function of the IRS is generally to ensure that 
taxpayers pay their taxes, the agency holds a slightly different role 
regarding charitable nonprofit organizations. The IRS regulates 
charitable nonprofits under its Tax Exempt and Government Entities 
Division (TE/GE).9 The mission of TE/GE is “to provide our 
customers top quality service by helping [them] understand and 
comply with applicable tax laws and to protect the public interest by 
applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”10 The Division 
determines whether an organization will be granted tax exempt status, 
issues and reviews annual information returns (IRS Form 990), and 
revenue rulings and procedures.11 Its role is to ensure that there is 
                                                      
7 See, e.g., Free Fertility Found. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 21, 25–26 (2010) (applying 
private benefit doctrine).
8 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fragmented Oversight of Nonprofits in the United States: 
Does it Work? Can it Work?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2016).
9 See I. R. S., Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, (last 
updated June 1, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/tax-exempt-
government-entities-division-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/2UHY-5ED9]. This 
source doesn’t include all the information attributed to it. I think the author may 
have been trying to cite to this article https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits. 
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compliance with the tax laws necessitating, in this instance, some 
involvement in nonprofit governance. While the agency may have 
been initially charged with a more limited role, reports commissioned 
by Congress and revisions in the Internal Revenue Code led to an 
increase in the role the IRS plays in charitable nonprofit regulation.12
As other committees were commissioned13 with the goal of improving 
voluntary compliance, and reporting forms were revised in 1961 and 
again in 1969 as a result of The Tax Reform Act of 1969, it was 
determined that the IRS remain the “principal regulating agency for 
tax exempt organizations”.14 In 1996, Congress enacted tax laws that 
provided for the imposition of excise taxes on public charities, opening 
the IRS into the realm of fiduciary duties. And in 1998, when Congress 
overhauled the IRS, the role of the agency changed from one with a 
focus on tax collection to one that would maintain “the integrity of the 
tax exempt sector.”15 As a result, an organization receiving tax-exempt 
status by this division of the IRS must continue to meet the standards 
under which it was granted exempt status. At the same time, it must 
abide by the law of the state where it was incorporated, and often it 
must conform to the laws of the other states in which it has offices.16
A. State Oversight
Nonprofit corporations are governed by state law. An organization 
choosing the nonprofit corporate form generally incorporates in the 
jurisdiction where it is located, although for many other reasons, 
including taxes and additional sites of operation, it may choose another 
state.17 Therefore, the structure of a charitable organization 
(corporation, trust, unincorporated organization) “affects the role of 
                                                      
12 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION, 65–75 (2004) (The Walsh 
Commission, the Cox Commission and the Reece commission, focusing mostly on 
Foundation behavior based on a suspicion that this type of charity was being used 
by the wealthy for power). 
13 Id. at 74.
14 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 12, at 82.
15 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 12, at 97.
16 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-31-1501 (2012) (explaining foreign corporation 
requirements); see also N.C. CODE ANN. § 55A-1-21(2) and § 55A-15-01(a).
17 Stephanie Dube Dwilson, How to Choose Where to Incorporate Your Non-Profit,
CHRON (last visited Aug. 28, 2018), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/choose-
incorporate-nonprofit-66602.html [https://perma.cc/6R8Q-C9T7].
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the state in [its] affairs.”18
When an organization is structured as a nonprofit corporation, the 
attorney general has only the powers specified in the state’s nonprofit 
corporation statute or other statutes. Normally these statutes involve 
the attorney general only in the case of egregious or criminal behavior 
by the organization or its board or, in some instances, during the 
dissolution process. When the nonprofit organization is structured as a 
charitable trust, however, the role of the state attorney general is 
greater because the beneficiaries of a charitable trust are considered to 
be indefinite and unable to speak for themselves. In those cases, the 
state attorney general has the common law power, under the doctrine 
of parens patriae, to bring suit to enforce the terms of a charitable trust 
and to see that charitable trust assets are in fact used for charitable 
purposes.19
Typically, the state attorney general is responsible for overseeing 
charitable organizations in order to protect the public’s interest. He or 
she is responsible for assuring the proper distribution of charitable 
trusts and can bring an appropriate action when there is a perceived 
violation. The attorney general is responsible for the enforcement of 
charitable solicitation laws and for overseeing mergers and 
acquisitions between charities. It is only the attorney general who can 
institute a legal proceeding because the general public lacks standing.20
“[C]hoice of form does make a difference for operational, 
governance and dissolution purposes.”21 States employ widely 
differing approaches regarding nonprofit corporations.22
                                                      
18 NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING 
NONPROFIT AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.05 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING]; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2,
§§ 1.51–.53, 3.04, 8.09, 13.09, 14.02; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142, 5250, 6511, 9230 
(West 2018); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112; 2., 329 P.2d 118, 132–33
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), superseded by statute, CAL. PROB. CODE § 24 (West 
2018), as recognized in Patton v. Sherwood, 152 Cal. App. 4th 339, 347 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
19 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18; see also Rob Atkinson, 
Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable 
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998); A UNIFORM SUPERVISION OF
TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACT, 7B U.L.A. 727 (1978); ABA, supra
note 2; CAL. CORP. CODE, supra note 18; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP., supra note 
18; Brown, supra note 18, at 132–33.
20 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18; Atkinson, supra note 19,
at 657.
21 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 2.03.
22 Compare MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1952), with MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1964); see also MARILYN E. PHELAN,
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B. Internal Revenue Code
An organization, and therefore its board of directors, has a “duty” 
to maintain its tax exemption, which means it must meet the tests set 
forth by Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c)(3):23 the 
organization must be organized and operated in keeping with its
charitable mission; it must avoid private inurement; and it cannot 
partake in political activity (no electioneering, some lobbying).24 The 
private inurement test states that an organization does not qualify for 
exemption if the organization’s net earnings inure in whole or in part 
to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.25 Private 
shareholders and individuals are the insiders of an exempt 
organization, including its board members, officers, and managers.26
Also, if private individuals or groups, having no direct control over the 
organization, benefit to an inordinate amount, a private benefit exists, 
which is also a violation of the requirements of IRC section 
501(c)(3).27
III. ROLE OF GOVERNING BODY
The governing body of a nonprofit organization, the board of 
                                                      
NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS (2000) 
(See individual state statutes for information on their approach to nonprofit 
corporations).
23 See supra note 4, The statutory language lists the following as exempt from 
taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings 
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no 
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene 
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office.
24 See Id.
25 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(2), (d)(1)(ii) (1960).
26 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
27 See I.R.C., supra note 4; Treas. Reg., supra note 25.
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directors (board), is responsible for overseeing the operation of the 
organization, ensuring integrity to its mission and effectiveness of its 
management, a role that is critical to the legal operation of the 
organization.28 The board oversees the exercise of all the powers of the 
organization in accordance with applicable state law and by the 
mandates of the organization’s bylaws.29 The board may be self-
perpetuating with members serving specific terms throughout the 
organizations’ existence.30 The nonprofit organization is mission-
driven; therefore, directors are held to a high standard of care to protect 
the organization and uphold its mission.31 Since these organizations 
are public charities, it is imperative that their missions to serve the 
public are upheld.
State laws require that the board of directors individually and 
collectively act in the name of and commit the highest level of care to 
the organization.32 Moreover, the board is bound through the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.33 The board’s duty to mission 
                                                      
28 See Board Roles and Responsibilities, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS, (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/board-roles-
and-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/F2M6-WBEP]; Herrington J. Bryce, 
Nonprofit Board Responsibilities: The Basics, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/08/21/nonprofit-board-governance-
responsibilities-basic-guide/ [https://perma.cc/L3X7-UVJW].
29 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, supra note 2, at § 8.01(b) .
30 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, supra note 2, at §§ 8.05–.06 (State statutes can 
permit the founder of a nonprofit corporation to include a provision in the articles 
of incorporation or the bylaws that requires the founder or another specified person 
or body to agree to all or certain board decisions); See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT, supra note 2, at § 8.21(a). Specifically, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 
provides the following: 
Some, but less than all, of the powers, authority or functions of the board 
of directors of a nonprofit corporation under this [act] may be vested by 
the articles of incorporation or bylaws in a designated body . . . . To the 
extent the powers, authority, or functions of the board of directors have 
been vested in the designated body, the directors are relieved from their 
duties and liabilities with respect to those powers, authority, and 
functions.
31 See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, supra note 2, at § 8.30; CAL. CORP.
CODE, supra note 18, at § 5047.5; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW, supra note 
18, at §§ 715-a, 717 (The board’s primary responsibility is to oversee the 
organization to which it owes its fiduciary duties).
32 See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008); E.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-31-101-1708.
33 See Board Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 28.
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(duty of obedience) states that the board must “‘be faithful to the 
purposes and goals of the organization,’ since ‘[u]nlike [the for-profit 
corporation], whose ultimate objective is to make money,’” the 
nonprofit corporation’s objective is to carry out its particular 
mission.34
The board’s primary responsibility is to oversee the organization 
to which it owes fiduciary duties. Because the organization’s activities 
and affairs are under the board’s direction, the board must work to be 
vigilant in carrying out and documenting all decisions. In a charitable 
nonprofit organization, the board of directors makes decisions as a 
single body; individual directors, in the absence of board authorization, 
have no authority to bind the corporation.35
A board’s relationship to its senior executive varies according to a 
multitude of factors, such as size of the organization, size of the board, 
mission of the organization, and customs within the particular 
“industry.” For example, the board of a very large organization may 
depend on the senior executive to a greater extent and delegate more 
authority than would the board of a much smaller organization. It 
remains the board’s duty to oversee the organization, no matter the 
external influencing conditions.
In some organizations, a senior paid executive may be a member 
of the board of directors, though issues involving a conflict of interest 
(implicating the duty of loyalty) become even greater in such 
situations. It becomes imperative that the board document all decisions 
and require the senior paid executive to recuse herself from decisions 
that could both jeopardize the integrity of the board and the executive 
                                                      
34 In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (quoting V. BJORKLUND ET AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW 
AND PRACTICE: WITH TAX ANALYSIS §§ 1–3(c) (3d ed. 2007)). James Fishman 
describes the duty of obedience, in part, as follows:
Beyond obeying the organizational documents, a nonprofit corporation 
and its directors and officers have the responsibility to comply with the 
law . . . . Note that although directors are responsible for compliance with 
legal requirements in areas of obvious significance, such as payment of 
taxes, they are not responsible for technical compliance with every aspect 
of a regulatory regime.
James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 237–
38 (2003); See also Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary 
Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008).
35 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03.
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and violate their fiduciary duties.36
A. Fiduciary Duties
The fiduciary duty of the board as a whole and of its members 
individually finds “its genesis in trust law, fiducia, meaning trust.”37
“[T]he relationship between a board and the organization it serves is 
similar to the relationship between a trustee and the trust’s beneficiary. 
The fiduciary obligation serves as ‘an alternative to [the] direct 
monitoring’ [by the states or federal government] of a board’s 
behavior.”38 The board is responsible for monitoring not just 
compliance with applicable law but also compliance with board-
adopted policies, including those relating to conflicts of interest, travel 
and entertainment expense reimbursement, whistle-blowing, and 
document retention, as well as broader codes of ethics.39
                                                      
36 Id. at § 3.03(b)(3).
37 Id. at § 3.03; see also CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 6–7; Fishman, supra
note 34, at 227–28.
38 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03.
39 See Id. §§ 3.01–.02; CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 6–7; “[I]n a business 
corporation, the directors owe their duties to the corporation.” RESTATEMENT OF 
THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 310 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2007). But “in a private (noncharitable) trust, trustees owe fiduciary duties to 
the beneficiaries . . . . In the case of a charitable trust, which lacks ascertainable 
beneficiaries who can enforce their rights, the fiduciary duties are instead said to 
run to the charitable purpose . . . .” Id. Subject to any authority reserved to the 
[organization’s] membership or other person, the board’s functions normally 
include, but are not limited to: 
(1) monitoring implementation of the [organization’s] purposes, and 
modifying those purposes as necessary and appropriate . . . ;
(2) adopting bylaw provisions that address governance issues, and 
amending the bylaws as necessary and appropriate; 
(3) constituting the governing board and filling the chief executive 
position, and monitoring the board’s and the chief executive’s 
performance of their legal and organizational responsibilities; 
(4) holding periodic meetings of the board (and membership, if any); 
(5) setting and reviewing policies, particularly those addressing matters 
reserved to the board by law or the organizational documents, and 
providing direction to and oversight of management; 
(6) guarding the [organization’s] fiscal integrity and performance by 
adopting the budget, setting investment and spending policies, 
seeking appropriate resources, and exercising oversight over the 
[organization’s] assets, both investment and programmatic; 
(7) overseeing appropriate communication with the [organization’s] 
constituencies and the public; and 
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Nonprofit organizations sometimes differ from the standard 
corporate model in their governance.40 Certain “state statutes permit 
the founder of a nonprofit corporation to include a provision in the 
articles of incorporation that requires the assent of the founder or 
another specified person or body to all or certain board decisions, or 
that vests authority over certain issues in a person or body.”41
Nevertheless, the fiduciary duties that the board owes the 
organization find much in common with corporate law.42 An analysis 
of recent board activities in the organizations discussed in this article 
must necessarily include both areas of law.
1. The Duty of Care
“The duty of care asks a director: (1) to be reasonably informed; 
(2) to participate in decisions; and (3) to do so in good faith.”43 The 
business judgment rule (from for-profit corporate law), which has been 
applied consistently to nonprofit organizations, provides that an 
informed decision by the board of an organization about business 
                                                      
(8) establishing appropriate procedures for internal controls, including 
financial controls, legal compliance, and information flow to the 
board.
Id. § 320.
40 Id. § 320 cmt. b(2).
41 Id.
42 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974); La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 
F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The standard of care for a director of a nonprofit 
corporation was long held to be more demanding than that for a director of a for-
profit business. The theory was that a nonprofit corporation was analogous to a 
public trust, and its directors were deemed its trustees. However, modern statutes 
and case law have altered that, and now the standard for nonprofit corporate 
directors is usually the same as that of their for-profit counterparts.”). 
43 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(a); see also
CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 6–7. The phrase “best interests of the 
corporation” is key to an explication of a director’s duties. The term “corporation” 
is a surrogate for the business enterprise as well as a frame of reference 
encompassing the shareholder body. In determining the corporation’s “best 
interests,” the director has wide discretion in deciding how to weigh near-term 
opportunities versus long-term benefits as well as in making judgments where the 
interests of various groups within the shareholder body or having other cognizable 
interests in the enterprise may differ.
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30, cmt. 1(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
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matters is presumed correct.44 Many state statutes continue to require 
the additional responsibility of acting with the care of an ordinarily 
prudent person in similar circumstances, though the Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act of 2008 has removed this standard.45
2. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty mandates that directors act in the best interest 
of the organization and not for themselves or for another.46 It is in this 
area of the law that there is a great deal of misstepping by boards, often 
causing regulators to become involved in the organization’s 
governance affairs. If a director has interests that conflict with the 
organization, the director has the duty to disclose the conflict before 
the board takes action.47 A director that knows of a corporate 
opportunity that may fall within the organization’s future activities 
                                                      
44 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(a)(2); Fishman, 
supra note 34, at 233.
45 E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act. No. 
263). The business judgment rule enjoys wide judicial acceptance in the nonprofit 
context. “The purpose of the business judgment rule is to protect rational, 
informed, business decisions and to permit risk taking, innovation, and creative 
entrepreneurial activities, which are characteristic of nonprofit corporate 
enterprises.” CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(a)(2). 
46 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(b)(1); see also
Nixon v. Lichtenstein, 959 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Stern, 381 F. 
Supp. at 1014–16; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
One commentator stated as follows: 
Some [state statutes] do not explicitly require a director to have an 
objectively reasonable belief that his actions are in the best interests of the 
corporation, with some adopting a more lenient standard that merely 
requires that the director have a subjective belief that his actions are in the 
best interests of the corporation or at most requires a showing that the 
director’s belief is honest or in good faith. A few are silent on the issue of 
whether the director’s belief will be evaluated by an objective or a 
subjective test, while some have adopted a different yet also lenient 
standard in that they do not impose an affirmative duty on directors to act 
in the best interests of the corporation. Other variations include a 
requirement that a director . . . act “in or not opposed” [to] the 
corporation’s best interests or that he act “with a view to the interests of 
the corporation,” a vague formulation that also appears to fall short of an 
affirmative duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. 
MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 208 (2004). 
47 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(b)(2).
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must disclose the transaction to the board and provide an opportunity 
for the board to act before engaging in such transaction.48
The board of directors may approve a transaction between the 
organization and a board member, waive the organization’s interest in 
a transaction between another person and a board member, or approve 
or waive any other conflict of interest of the board member. However, 
the board can only take these actions if, in good faith, the board 
reasonably determines that the transaction is both fair to and in the best 
interests of the organization or that the approval or waiver of the 
organization’s interest in any other conduct is in the best interests of 
the organization.49
If the organizational documents so allow, the board does have the 
power to alter fiduciary duties.50 However, the board cannot do the 
following: (1) “[r]educe the duty of care . . . so as to permit a knowing 
violation of law, intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or gross 
negligence”;51 (2) [r]educe the duty of loyalty . . . in a manner that is 
manifestly unreasonable, taking into account the charitable nature of 
the organization”;52 or (3) “[a]bsolve a fiduciary from the obligation to 
act in good faith.”53
                                                      
48 Id. § 3.03(b)(3). The duty of loyalty requires that the director or officer place the 
interests of the organization over any personal or individual interest. It further 
requires that directors not use their position to make a personal profit or to gain 
other personal advantage. A director must be sensitive to potential conflict, disclose 
the conflict before the board takes action, and, upon disclosure, have a disinterested 
board review the matter. The disclosure should be in writing and be fully recorded 
in the board minutes. Examples are listed throughout state statutes and the Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act and include taking insider advantages, improperly using 
material nonpublic corporate information and usurping a corporate opportunity. A 
conflict of interest may occur directly or indirectly, for example, a conflict may 
arise from a family relationship or a director may have an investment relationship 
with an entity with which the corporation is dealing. The duty of loyalty requires a 
director be sensitive to potential conflict, disclose the conflict before the board 
takes action and upon disclosure, have a disinterested board review the matter. The 
disclosure should be in writing and fully recorded in the board minutes. Id.
49 Id. § 3.03(b)(3).
50 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 305 
(AM. LAW INST. 2007).
51 Id. § 305(b).
52 Id. § 305(a). 
53 Id. § 305(c). The Restatement’s comment to this rule says as follows: 
Both corporate and trust law are essentially enabling regimes, setting forth 
default rules in the absence of direction to the contrary in the trust 
instrument or articles of incorporation and bylaws. Notably, both trust law 
and corporate law have recognized the power of the settlor or 
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3. Duty of Obedience
“Boards of [d]irectors are bound through the duty of [mission 
(obedience)] by the founding documents of a corporation (corporate 
articles and bylaws) in carrying out the corporation’s actions and in the 
expenditure of funds gifted to the corporation.”54 Moreover, [t]he duty 
of obedience requires that the board of directors operate the 
organization for exempt purposes.55 The board is responsible for 
knowing the content of the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, and 
all other founding documents and for assuring compliance. Procedures 
should be put in place so that the expectations are clear to those 
overseeing and those operating the organization. Maintaining 
nonprofit and tax exempt status is the duty of the board, as well as 
assuring that the proper tax and other required documents are filed 
(e.g., Form 990).56
In addition, “the board of directors of a nonprofit is also 
responsible for setting the compensation for the executive director and 
for directing investments for the organization. Because of the 
complexity of finances and investments, the board is required to meet 
                                                      
incorporators (and subsequently the board, subject to ratification by 
members, if any) to provide an exculpatory clause defining certain 
behavior not to be a breach of fiduciary duty; to adopt a monetary shield 
to protect fiduciaries from the risk of personal financial harm arising out 
of the performance of fiduciary duties . . . ; and to permit indemnification 
and the purchase of director’s and officer’s liability insurance . . . . As 
limited by the requirements of law and the organizational documents . . . , 
the decisions to adopt such provisions are governed by the board’s general 
duties of loyalty and care. 
Id. § 305 cmt. a.
54 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(c); see also In re
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1999); see also Peter D. Jacobson & Soniya Keskar Mathur, Health Law 2010: 
It’s Not All About the Money, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 389, 392–94 (2010) (discussing 
duty of obedience in context of Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital and 
Littauer v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), which “have 
generated an unclear outline of director obligations with respect to an 
organization’s mission,” and concluding that “the Littauer decision appears to limit 
the [Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital] court’s reliance on the duty of 
obedience to preserve board obligations to the health care organization’s mission”).
55 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(c).
56 Id. § 3.03(c) (footnote omitted).
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the ‘prudent person’57 standard when making investment decisions.”58
B. State and Federal Law
State statutes differ in the exact language and specific requirements 
for these duties, though for the most part states follow portions of the 
Model Nonprofit Corporate Act, Third Edition.59 “For many aspects 
                                                      
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 90 & cmt. m; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF 
INST. FUNDS ACT § 3 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
2006). 
58 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, § 3.03(c) (footnotes 
omitted). 
59 The RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
states the following: 
Twenty-one state statutes (including Delaware’s) now permit a nonprofit 
corporation to adopt a charter amendment shielding liability for breaches 
of the duty of care. [See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West, 
Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) 
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-202 (West,
Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.)] . . . .
. . . .
State-law monetary shields generally are unavailable in cases of breach of 
the duty of loyalty, typically self-dealing. However, depending on where 
the law locates the failure of fiduciaries to protect the organization from 
harm caused by inattentive performance, a simple exclusion for “breach of 
the duty of loyalty” could expose a board member to monetary liability for 
inadvertent breach.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ch. 3,
topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2007). Regarding a board’s removal of a 
director for failure to satisfy attendance requirements, see the MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT § 8.08(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Draft 2017). “The board of 
directors may remove a director of a nonmembership corporation . . . [w]ith or 
without cause, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide that directors 
may be removed only for cause.” MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, THIRD EDITION
§ 8.08(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Draft 2017). As to removal for cause, see In 
re Grace v. Grace Inst., 226 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1967); In re Davidson. v. James, 568 
N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). Citing Grace, the Davidson court held,
[T]he Board of Governors of respondent NAC had the inherent power to 
remove the petitioners for cause, where the petitioners’ commencement of 
personal injury actions against respondent NAC and searching its records 
for confidential information as to the nature and extent of insurance 
coverage, was in breach of their fiduciary obligations to NAC as members 
of its Board of Governors, and contrary to the interest of the organization. 
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of governance, state enabling statutes commonly provide default rules 
that operate in the absence of contrary provisions in the organizational 
documents.”60 Nevertheless, “[f]or a nonprofit organization, [the 
articles of incorporation] contain such critical clauses as the 
organization’s statement of purpose and whether it has members.”61
The general requirement for drafting bylaws and the substantive 
requirements therefor are included in state statutes.
C. Board Investing
Board spending and investing are also matters for board oversight. 
The state version of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds 
Act (UMIFA) and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (UPMIFA), or similar statute, are applicable to the 
investment and spending of nonprofit charitable organizations.62 The 
Acts allow an organization’s board to make decisions in keeping with 
the organization’s investment strategies.”63
IV. THREE CASE STUDIES
                                                      
Id. at 398 (citing In re Grace v. Grace Inst., 226 N.E.2d at 533). The court added, 
“Petitioners have failed to make a showing warranting court intervention into the 
internal affairs of respondent NAC pursuant to § 618 of the Not-For-Profit 
Corporation Law where there is no indication that the petitioners’ removal was 
tainted by fraud or other wrongdoing.” Id. (citing In re Scipioni v. Young Women’s 
Christian Ass’n, 482 N.Y.S.2d 390, 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)). Note, however, 
that the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law does not empower a board to
remove a director without cause; only the membership (if any) has the right to do 
so. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 706(b)–(c) (McKinney, Westlaw 
through L.2018); see also Lutz v. Tanglwood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 866 A.2d 
471, 473–75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (discussing interpretation of Pennsylvania 
statute requiring “proper cause” for director removal).
60 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 320 
cmt. d(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007)
61 Id.
62 Id. § 335; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3 (NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006). As of August 2018, UPMIFA had been 
adopted in all states and territories except Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico. PRUDENT 
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (UPMIFA) (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2006). UPMIFA section 8 provides that the “[act] applies to institutional funds 
existing on or established after [the effective date of this act]. As applied to 
institutional funds [then] existing . . . [,] this act governs only decisions made or 
actions taken on or after that date.” Id. § 8.
63 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 335 
cmt. b(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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Most nonprofit organizations carry out their missions faithfully 
and have boards that promote and guide them in accordance with their 
organizational documents. But some do not abide by state or federal 
law. The three case studies below are not only examples of board 
behavior that gives rise to investigations but also serve as points of 
reference for discussing the regulation that is the subject of this Article. 
In reviewing the regulatory response to the situations discussed, one 
might ask whether having both the IRS and attorneys general involved
in monitoring the governance of these organizations actually provides 
more oversight or whether dual regulation is fostering carelessness in 
state and federal oversight. If the attorneys general operate under the 
assumption that the IRS is monitoring governance, and vice versa, 
perhaps things are being missed. The three examples below provide 
evidence.
A. Trump Foundation
In June 2018, the New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit in the 
New York Supreme Court against Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump 
Jr., Ivanka Trump, Eric F. Trump, and the Donald J. Trump 
Foundation.64 The Petition alleges that 
[f]or more than a decade, the Donald J. Trump Foundation has 
operated in persistent violation of state and federal law 
governing New York State charities. This pattern of illegal 
conduct by the Foundation and its board members includes 
improper and extensive political activity, repeated and willful 
self-dealing transactions, and failure to follow basic fiduciary 
obligations or to implement even elementary corporate 
formalities required by law.65
According to the Petition, the Foundation was incorporated as a 
“private New York not-for-profit corporation”66 in 1987 and was 
granted 501(c)(3) status as a private foundation.67 “The Foundation’s 
                                                      
64 New York v. Donald J. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018), 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/court_stamped_petition.pdf.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Id. The Foundation’s private foundation status is classified as a § 509(a) 
organization. Id. One casebook gives the following definition:
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stated mission is to ‘receive and maintain a fund . . . to [be] 
use[d] . . . exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, literary[,] or 
educational purposes either directly or by contributions to 
organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.’”68 In 2016, the Foundation 
reported $1 million in assets.69
In the Petition, the New York Attorney General establishes the 
legal authority for bringing this case.70 First, the Petition states that the 
“Attorney General is responsible for overseeing the activities of New 
York not-for-profit corporations and the conduct of their officers and 
directors . . . .”71 Moreover, “on behalf of the People of the State of 
New York,”72 the Attorney General can bring proceedings to, among 
other things, “dissolve a corporation,”73 “enforce any [statutory] right 
given . . . to members, a director or an officer of a charitable 
                                                      
[A private] foundation is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization with 
its own funds (usually from a single source, either an individual, family [,] 
or corporation) and program managed by its own trustees and directors, 
which was established to maintain or aid educational, social, charitable, 
religious, or other activities serving the common welfare primarily by 
making grants to other nonprofit organizations.
CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 911 (quoting F. EMERSON ANDREWS,
PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 11 (1956)). Interestingly, a 501(c)(3) organization 
is considered a “private foundation” unless it meets certain criteria in I.R.C. 
§ 509(a). Id. at 912. Generally, section 509(a) states that the following are not 
private foundations: (1) “traditional public charities,” such as churches, schools, 
and hospitals; (2) “gross receipts organizations,” which “receive more than one-
third of their support from gifts, grants, fees, and ‘gross receipts’ from admissions 
[or] sales of goods or services . . . ”; (3) “supporting organizations,” which “are not 
publicly supported but have a closely defined control or programmatic relationship 
with one or more public supported organizations”; and (4) organizations “testing 
for public safety.” Id. at 913–15 (citing I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(i)–(vi), 509(a)(1)–
(4) (2018)). For more information, see Trs. for the Home for Aged Women v. 
United States, No. 79-1036-F, 1986 WL 3494 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 1986); Educ. 
Athletic Ass’n v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. 1525 (1999); Windsor Found. v. United 
States, No. 76-0441-R, 1977 WL 1254 (E.D. Va. 1977); Lapham Found., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (2002); Polm Family Found. v. United States, 644 
F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
68 Petition at 4, New York v. Donald J. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (quoting 




72 Id. at 5.
73 Id. (quoting N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112(a)(5) (West, Westlaw 
through L.2018)).
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corporation,”74 and “seek damages and other appropriate remedies.”75
New York’s not-for-profit statute forbids a charitable corporation from 
“distribut[ing] any part of its income to the directors or officers of the 
corporation,”76 and also forbids a private foundation from “engag[ing] 
in any act of self-dealing which would result in the taxation of any 
amount involved with respect to any such act of self-dealing under 
section 4941 of the [Internal Revenue Code].”77
The Petition continues, alleging insufficient Board oversight78 and 
that the “Foundation’s Board existed in name only.”79 It further states 
that the Board members individually failed to exercise their fiduciary 
duties, did not meet at all for nineteen years, and did not oversee the 
Foundation’s activities at all.80 The Board had no policies in place for 
the direction of the Foundation, used no criteria for considering and 
approving grants, and never reviewed any annual reports, as required 
by law.81 The Petition claims that, because there was no functioning 
Board, “Mr. Trump ran the Foundation according to his whim.”82 The 
Foundation did not adopt a conflict-of-interest policy in accordance 
with both state and federal law.83
The lawsuit further states the following:
[T]he Foundation was little more than a checkbook for 
payments to not-for-profits from Mr. Trump and entities that 
he owned. This resulted in multiple violations of state and 
federal law because payments were made using Foundation 
money regardless of the purpose of the payment. Mr. Trump 
                                                      
74 Id. (quoting § 112(a)(7)).
75 Id. (quoting § 112(a)(10)).
76 Id. (quoting § 515(a)).
77 Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8(a)(2) (McKinney, 
Westlaw through L. 2018)).
78 Id. at 9.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (citing N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 519 (West, Westlaw through L. 
2018)).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 10 (citing N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-A (West, Westlaw 
through L.2018)); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.9(d) (2018) 
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2018)); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-0056, FORM 1023, at 3, 4, 17 (2017) 
[hereinafter FORM 1023] (questions V.4a and V.5a, and Schedule C, Section 1, 
question 10); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO.
1545-0047, FORM 990, at 6 (2017) [hereinafter FORM 990] (questions VI.B.12a and 
VI.C.19).
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used charitable assets to pay off the legal obligations of entities 
he controlled, to promote Trump hotels, to purchase personal 
items, and to support his campaign for president.84
The Petition concludes by asking the state of New York to dissolve 
the Trump Foundation and distribute its remaining assets to other 
charitable organizations.85
One might ask how for thirty years, if the allegations are correct, 
the Trump Foundation was permitted to function in this way? The state 
attorney general had the authority to monitor the organization and its 
board, and the IRS had access to the organization’s Form 990s. The 
violations cited in the Petition state a complete lack of compliance on 
the part of the Foundation and a good deal of reckless self-dealing 
(e.g., “Board members failed to exercise their fiduciary duty to provide 
oversight and control of the organization for at least nineteen years. 
The Board has not met since 1999 and has not overseen the activities 
of the foundation in any way”).
One of the problems with the Trump Foundation board was the 
inclusion of Trump’s adult children, Donald Jr., Ivanka, and Eric, as 
board members, which raises questions of conflict of interest and self-
dealing. All three, as well as the sitting President of the United States, 
have been named as defendants in the case.86 The participation of 
numerous family members in the organization’s board and 
management created a troubling environment all too common in 
private foundations controlled by families.87
                                                      
84 Petition at 2, New York v. Donald J. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018); see also
Connors, supra note 1.
85 Petition at 40, New York v. Donald J. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
86 Id. at 1.
87 One article received insight on why family participation on a board could be 
problematic:
Lesley Rosenthal is the outgoing general counsel of Lincoln Center for the 
Performing Arts Board and a contributor to the Harvard University Law 
School’s Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. In a 
study entitled “Nonprofit Corporate Governance: The Board’s Role,” 
Rosenthal provided a nearly complete definition of what a nonprofit board 
should be and, by implication, what it should not be:
Board independence and board attention are of paramount 
importance in good nonprofit governance. The independence of 
the board is key because of the non-distribution constraint—
nonprofits exist to serve the public interest, not to benefit owners 
or other private parties. Business or family relationships between 
 
2019] NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE  173
B. Resnick Foundation
Stewart and Linda Resnick created the Resnick Charitable 
Foundation in 1991.88 At the time, Mr. Resnick was president, Mrs. 
Resnick was chairwoman and “four senior officials at Wonderful”89
(the couple’s privately held company that is one of the nation’s largest 
tree nut growers)90 were officers. Foundation officials had recently 
been questioned about the Foundation’s 2016 tax filing, which showed 
“$50 million in outstanding loans to two companies whose owners 
supply nuts to the couple’s pistachio empire…”91 Because the loans 
made up 88% of the Foundation’s total assets, questions were raised 
as to whether indirect self-dealing has existed.92 Again, this raises the 
question, why did it take so long for any regulator to notice that 
inappropriate activity was being carried out by this board of directors? 
As stated above, the state attorney general had the authority to 
investigate this matter since board fiduciary duties were being violated 
and other acts of self-dealing were occurring. The IRS should have 
noticed sooner that the informational return raised serious questions. 
C. Goodwill Nebraska
Nebraska Attorney General Doug Peterson began investigating 
Goodwill Omaha in 2016 for alleged wrongdoing on the part of the 
organization and its board of directors.93 His findings were released in 
a report in June 2018 confirming alleged accounts that the organization 
                                                      
the organization or its executives and a board member or her firm 
are frowned upon and should be strictly scrutinized under a 
conflict of interest policy administered by independent directors. 
Even absent outright business or family relationships, a common 
shortcoming of nonprofit boards is that they are too small, too 
insular, or too deferential to the founder or chief executive.
Connors, supra note 1. See also Ruth McCambridge, NY Attorney General Sues 
Trump and Family for Flagrant Misuse of Charity, NONPROFIT Q. (June 15, 2018), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/06/15/ny-attorney-general-sues-trump-and-
family-for-flagrant-misuse-of-charity/. 
88 Resnick Foundation, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org
(search charity search field for “Resnick Foundation”; then click on “Resnick 
Foundation”).




93 McCambridge, supra note 1.
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overpaid its executives, provided little support to the individuals it was 
organized to serve, and operated like a for-profit business directing 
profits from the store back into the business “in the form of growth 
capital and salaries.”94 The Attorney General reported that “the public 
was deceived as to the charitable purpose of the stores”95 and that the 
board was inattentive, resulting in poor “management practices.”96
“‘[T]he leadership of Goodwill Omaha [justified] their focus on 
constant retail expansion by pointing to retail sales as furthering their 
mission programs’—but there [was] no evidence [that the money] was 
used for programs.”97
The report indicated that the trustees failed to recognize a problem 
because of “a consent agenda” in which an executive committee with 
an inappropriately large role examined trustee matters before the 
trustees did so.98
The executive “committee also conducted the review of the CEO 
and set his salary.”99 “The report says, ‘It was evident in our interviews 
of the former board members that they were shocked by much of the 
reporting in the World-Herald’s series exposing abuses . . . . [It] seems 
self-evident . . . those directors were not sufficiently engaged.’”100
Investigators found that for years, none of the store revenue was used 
to support the job programs that were part of the organization’s 
mission and there was “no correlation at all” between how the charity 
was performing its true mission and what executives were paid and 
that excessive pay further deprived Goodwill of dollars for its 
mission.101
V. CURRENT GOVERNANCE THEORIES
The examples discussed above illustrate the types of activities 
being overlooked by regulators tasked with monitoring nonprofit 
organizations, which are subject to both state and federal law.




97 Id. (quoting PETERSON, supra note 6, at 7).
98 Id. (quoting PETERSON, supra note 6, at 37).
99 McCambridge, supra note 1.
100 Id. (quoting PETERSON, supra note 6, at 38).
101 Id. (quoting Henry J. Cordes, AG’s Goodwill Probe Faults Excessive Pay That 
Harmed Mission but Says Nonprofit Is Back on Track, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD
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Specifically, all nonprofit organizations, trusts, or unincorporated 
associations that seek 501(c)(3) status must complete an IRS Form 
1023 application.102 The IRS reviews this form and determines 
whether or not an organization is granted this status, allowing for 
various federal tax exemptions. Organizations that are granted this 
status may seek gifts that will be considered tax deductible by the IRS, 
giving a tax break not only to the organization but also to the donor 
(individual or other I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization).103 With few 
exceptions, such a benefit is unique to these charitable nonprofit tax-
exempt organizations.104 Such a system, not uncommon in other areas 
of the law (antitrust, employment), requires that both the state and the 
federal government provide oversight of these organizations. It might 
be said that these dual roles are critical and at the heart of our form of 
government because charitable nonprofit organizations, some say, 
enhance a “pluralistic society,” allowing the voices of the citizenry to 
be heard through the tax dollar support they provide these 
organizations.105 Scholars in this area disagree on whether dual 
oversight is most effective,106 whether it preempts state authority and 
therefore, undermines principles of federalism,107 or whether it is an 
overreach that is outside the IRS’s jurisdiction.108
A. Dual Oversight
“[S]tates and the federal government share oversight authority with 
                                                      
102 See Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/forms-
pubs/about-form-1023 (last updated May 24, 2018). If all of the requirements for 
exemption have been met, then the IRS, after reviewing Form 1023, has the 
authority to grant exemption.
103 CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, at 31; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (1960).
104 See CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 572. Most other tax-exempt 
organizations cannot attract tax deductible donations. See Id. While there are 
currently twenty-nine 501 sections, only the (c)(3), (c)(4) in instances where the 
organization is performing a charitable function and the gift is restricted to that use, 
and (c)(8) organizations, for specific charitable purposes. See generally Id. at 572–
624. Veterans organizations, I.R.C. § 501(c)(19), may also attract and accept tax 
deductible gifts because of our nation’s desire to assist veterans for their service. 
See generally Id. at 572–624.
105 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
106 E.g., Mayer, supra note 8.
107 E.g., Fishman, supra note 3.
108 E.g., Hopkins, supra note 3.
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respect to nonprofits,”109 though some oversight “reflects a division of 
responsibilities, . . . as opposed to an overlap of responsibilities.”110
This overlap causes the most disagreement and concern among
scholars, specifically in the area of fiduciary duties and regulation of 
boards of directors. While “the states have broad authority to impose 
such duties and enforce them,”111 the federal government has 
“established some similar duties through excise tax regimes.”112 And 
while “[c]ertain governance-related duties continue to primarily be 
imposed and enforced by the states,”113 such as the duty of care and 
the duty of obedience,114 the federal government has also set forth 
“best practices” in this governance area.115 “[S]tates have the broadest 
authority when it comes to the use of a nonprofit’s assets” with regard 
to the duty of mission (obedience), but the federal government also has 
a role in overseeing board functions because it requires that governing 
documents (articles of incorporation and bylaws), which fall under 
state law, include a dissolution clause, which satisfies the 
nondistribution constraint116 and a statement that there will be no 
private inurement or political activity in order to meet federal 
requirements.117
As one scholar posits, there is dual authority for imposing 
“registration, reporting, and related public disclosure requirements” 
where charitable nonprofit organizations are concerned, and 
oftentimes the states use federal requirements to their advantage when 
accepting submission of federal forms to meet state requirements.118
Most overlap occurs in governance issues, “particularly transactions 
with governing board members, officers, and other insiders that are 
subject both to the state law duty of loyalty and the federal prohibition 
on private inurement . . . .”119 Moreover, “there is both substantive and 
functional overlap, since the states and the federal government both set 
and enforce standards in this area.”120 However, less overlap exists 
                                                      
109 Mayer, supra note 8, at 948.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 949–50.





117 Id. at 951. 
118 Id. An example includes charitable solicitation laws, which require annual 
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“with respect to governance standards relating to the state law duty of 
care, in that the federal government suggests certain best practices by 
inquiring about them on the Form 990 but does not actually require 
any particular practices (except with respect to private
foundations).”121
The advantages of a dual system include having “at least two 
primary regulators . . . with partially but not completely overlapping 
responsibilities,”122 improved efficiency, and the potential for greater 
expertise.123 Some disadvantages include having little development in 
the area of expertise because of limited information sharing, the 
potential for duplication, and congressional proposals to further 
empower the IRS in this area.124 One such Congressional proposal 
would extend federal oversight into areas of governance and fiduciary 
duties.125 But Professor Marion Fremont-Smith makes clear that in her 
opinion a dual system may be the appropriate mechanism for 
addressing the consistent and varied bad board behaviors that need 
oversight.126
B. Preemption of State Authority and Undermining of the Principles 
of Federalism
As early as 2009, Professor James Fishman127 stated that the IRS 
had initiated a corporate governance initiative.128 He states that the 
intervention by the IRS into an area traditionally “the preserve of state 
nonprofit corporate law[] has little relationship to issues of tax 
compliance.”129 Rather, “[t]his corporate governance initiative has 
been accomplished in the face of [IRS] recognition that it has no 
statutory authority relating to these issues.”130 He argues that despite a 
lack of authority, the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and 
Means Committee began calling for greater accountability in the 
                                                      
121 Id.; see also ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR., FEDERALISM 216 (2011) (discussing 
concept of “dynamic federalism”).
122 Mayer, supra note 8, at 955. 
123 Id. at 957. 
124 Id. at 957–58.
125 See Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
613, 615 (2005).
126 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 46.




130 Id. at 548.
 
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13:1
 
178
nonprofit sector as early as 2006.131 Fishman continues, saying that 
Congress encouraged the IRS, “the primary federal regulator of 
charities . . . to increase its monitoring of charities.”132 After passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act133 in 2002, nonprofits began responding by 
initiating “best practices,” and in 2004 the IRS revamped its forms
(both the Form 1023 and Form 990) to include a series of questions 
regarding the governance practice of organizations that were filing.134
Fishman states that while “these are ‘recommended’ but not yet 
officially required to obtain exemption, . . . it would be a reckless 
charity to ignore the Service’s suggestions,”135 even though Congress 
has not yet “mandated the adoption of [certain] governance practices 
as a condition of tax exemption.”136 While Form 1023 and its 
instructions suggest that exempt determinations will not be denied 
based on governance issues,137 “the Service has denied exemptions 
because of the lack of an independent board, some independent 
members, or a conflict of interest policy.”138 Given this, little or no 
guidance has been given to IRS auditors or applicants.139 Fishman 
posits that these questions became the standard for an organization to 
be granted tax-exempt status; all the while the IRS had no real 
authority to seek and require this information in its decision-making 
                                                      
131 Id. at 546.
132 Id. at 547; see also Treas. Reg. § 601.101(a) (1960) (recognizing IRS authority 
over “assessment and collection of all taxes”).
133 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d–3, 78, 7201, 7202, 7211–20,
7231–34, 7241–46, 7261–66; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348–50, 1514A, 1519, 1520 (2018).
134 Fishman, supra note 3 at 560. Examples of governance questions from Form 
1023 include the following: “Are any of your officers, directors, or trustees related 
to each other through family or business relationships?”; “Do you or will the 
individuals that approve compensation arrangements follow a conflict of interest 
policy?”; “Do you or will you record in writing the decision made by each 
individual who decided or voted on compensation arrangements?”; “Do you or will 
you have any leases, contracts, loans, or other agreements with any organization in 
which any of your officers, directors, or trustees are also officers, directors, or 
trustees, or in which any individual officer, director, or trustee owns more than a 
35% interest?” FORM 1023, supra note 83, at 3, 4.
135 Fishman, supra note 3, at 560.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Fishman, supra note 3, at 562 (citing BONNIE S. BRIER, ADVISORY COMM. ON
TAX EXEMPT & GOV’T ENTITIES, THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION GOOD
GOVERNANCE ISSUES 33 (2008)).
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processes.140
As proof that there has been increased involvement by the IRS, 
Fishman states that in 1942, “[t]he Treasury Department required all 
tax-exempt organizations to file an annual information return.”141 The 
form was two pages, asked only three questions, and requested an 
income statement and balance sheet.142 Today, since the Form 990 was 
revamped in 2006, the form is twelve pages and asks a great variety of 
governance questions, though only for organizations whose gross 
income exceeds $200,000.143 Smaller organizations must submit EZ 
forms, which are much shorter and ask fewer governance questions.144
C. IRS Regulation Through Private Benefit
One prominent practitioner, Mr. Bruce Hopkins,145 states in a 
                                                      
140 Fishman, supra note 3, at 548; Hopkins, supra note 3.
141 Fishman, supra note 3, at 564.
142 Fishman, supra note 3, at 564–65; see also Robert M. Howard & David C. 
Nixon, Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and 
the Internal Revenue Service, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 245 (2003). Congress 
has a “strong preference for making policy choices itself rather than leaving them 
to the Treasury.” John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review 
of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 
87 (2003). When Congress decides to leave policymaking to the Treasury, it 
normally does not rely on the general delegation of authority in I.R.C. § 7805 but 
delegates specific regulatory authority. Id. at 87 n.310..
143 990 Series Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File Filing Phase In, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exempt-
organizations-file-filing-phase-in (last updated July 17, 2018).
144 See id.
145 Mr. Hopkins is very experienced in tax-exempt law: 
[He] concentrates on the representation of tax-exempt organizations, 
practicing with the Bruce R. Hopkins Law Firm, LLC, in Kansas City, 
Missouri. He is the Professor from Practice at the University of Kansas 
School of Law. He has authored or coauthored over 40 books on nonprofit 
law subjects, including A Nonprofit Lawyer; The Law of Tax-Exempt 
Organizations, Eleventh Edition; The Tax Law of Charitable Giving, Fifth 
Edition; The Law of Fundraising, Fifth Edition; Bruce R. Hopkins'
Nonprofit Law Dictionary; Fulfilling a Dream: The Ultimate Law Degree; 
How to be a Successful Philanthropist; and Beware the Commerciality 
Doctrine and Other Nonprofit Law Poetry. He writes a monthly 
newsletter, the Bruce R. Hopkins’ Nonprofit Counsel. He is listed in the 
Best Lawyers in America, for Nonprofit Organizations/Charities Law. He 
earned his JD and LLM at the [George Washington] University, his SJD at 
the University of Kansas, and his BA at the University of Michigan. He is 
a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and the state of Missouri.
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recent tax article that “[t]he IRS is unlawfully—and unfairly—
engaging in significant efforts to regulate the governance affairs of the 
nation’s public charities and other categories of tax-exempt 
organizations . . . . It is trying to dictate the composition of charities' 
governing boards, doing so by abusing its [authority to] grant 
recognition of or revoke exempt status.”146
Mr. Hopkins believes, more specifically, that the IRS is usurping 
this power to regulate governance through the “private benefit 
doctrine.”147 He cites many Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) and some 
cases to document this increasing encroachment,148 with the biggest 
concern being that PLRs are not authoritative guidance from the 
IRS.149 This type of issuance is not subject to notice or public 
comment.150 Hopkins questions whether the IRS has jurisdiction in the 
area of nonprofit governance because, as he sees it, the role of the IRS 
is to provide “taxpayer services, in the form of easily understandable 
information and prompt answers to questions, to make it as simple as 
possible for people and firms to pay their taxes.”151 Further, he states 
that “the IRS is essentially the tax collection and tax law enforcement 
agency for the federal government . . . . [As] a tax regulation states[,] 
‘[t]he Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the Department of the 
Treasury under the immediate direction of the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue.’”152
1. Private Benefit Doctrine
The private benefit doctrine is an application of the operational 
test, which is one of the tests an organization must meet to be granted 
501(c)(3) status as a public charity.153 Treasury Regulation section 
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), provides that:
                                                      
Hopkins, supra note 3, at 4 n.a1.
146 Id. at 4. 
147 Id. at 11.
148 Id. at 11, 13–15
149 Id. at 16.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 7.
152 Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 601.101(a) (1972)).
153 See CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, at 73. “Private 
benefit does not involve a benefit to insiders; rather it involves a benefit to private 
as opposed to public interests. An organization is not operated for exempt purposes 
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.” Id. at 73.
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[a]n organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for 
one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in 
activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt 
purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will 
not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its 
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.154
“An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for 
[charitable purposes] unless it serves a public rather than a private 
interest.”155 Thus, an organization must “establish that it is not 
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as 
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the 
organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such 
private interests.”156
Case law states, “[w]hether an organization is operated exclusively 
for exempt purposes is a factual determination to be based on the 
administrative record.”157 Contrary to what one might think, the term 
“exclusively” does not “mean ‘solely’ or ‘absolutely without 
exception.’”158 Rather, a court determines that an organization is not 
organized “exclusively” for a charitable purpose if it finds “the 
presence of a single [nonexempt] purpose [that is] substantial in 
nature, . . . regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] 
purposes.”159 A court always looks to “whether the benefits flowing to 
private persons are incidental to the main purpose of the organization, 
not whether those benefits are substantial.”160 Private benefit occurs 
when more than an insubstantial benefit is directed toward an 
individual or a group.161
While the most common example of private inurement or private 
benefit is excess compensation, several other forms can arise, 
especially with sales of property and transactions involving lending 
and rental arrangements. Self-dealing transactions by private 
foundations may, in certain circumstances, amount to instances of 
                                                      
154 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
155 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
156 Id.
157 Westward Ho v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2617 (1992) (citing B.S.W. Group, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978)). The burden of proof is on the Petitioner. 
Id.
158 Id. (quoting Church in Boston v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 102, 107 (1978)).
159 Id. (quoting Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)).
160 Id. (citing Ky. Bar Found. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921, 926 (1982)).
161 Id.
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private inurement or private benefit: “(1) sale or exchange, or leasing, 
of property between an organization and a private individual; (2) 
lending of money or other extensions of credit between an organization 
and a private individual; (3) furnishing goods, services, or facilities 
between an organization and a private individual; (4) payment of 
compensation (or payment or reimbursement of expenses) by an 
organization to a private individual; and (5) transfer to, or use by or for 
the benefit of, a private individual of the income or assets of an 
organization.”162 For example, one case dealt with a tax-exempt 
organization that sold a hospital at a low price “to insiders (board 
members, doctors on staff)” who, “within two years, . . . re-sold the 
hospital for almost twice what they had paid.”163 The Tax Court found 
that the IRS properly revoked the organization’s tax-exempt status 
because private inurement existed.164
2. Case Law and IRS Private Letter Rulings
In, Bubbling Well Church v. Commissioner,165 noted as faulty court 
analysis in this area by Hopkins, Bubbling Well filed an application 
for exemption under section 501(c)(3), claiming to be a church.166 The 
IRS denied the request, holding that Bubbling Well failed to show that 
it qualified for exempt status under section 501(c)(3) based on its 
inability to show that it was not operated for the private benefit of the 
owner, the Harberts family,167 stating
To qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3), petitioner 
has the burden of showing (1) that it was organized and 
operated exclusively for religious or charitable purposes, (2) 
that no part of its earnings inured to the benefit of a private 
individual or shareholder, and (3) that no substantial part of its 
activities consisted of the dissemination of propaganda or 
otherwise attempt[ed] to influence legislation or engaging in 
                                                      
162 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 435 (7th ed. 
1998).
163 CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 115 (discussing Anclote Psychiatric Ctr. v. 
Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1998)).
164 Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 17. 
165 Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 531 (1980), 
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political activity.”168
The U.S. Tax Court came to this conclusion because the Harberts 
were the only voting members of their entity, they comprised the only 
members of the board, and “nothing [was] shown in the statement of 
income and expenses as budgeted or expended for the care of the 
needy, the sick, or the imprisoned, traditionally the beneficiaries of the 
ministration of churches.”169 The IRS requested a list of the names and 
addresses of the organization’s active members along with an itemized 
statement of income and expenses.170 The Petitioner declined to 
properly answer and instead gave vague answers.171
Hopkins believes further, that in recent years, the IRS has chosen 
to state its position on nonprofit governance issues through its 
application and reporting forms172 and through the issuance of PLRs, 
oftentimes citing the private benefit doctrine. Several PLRs state that 
having only two individuals on a board automatically proves private 
benefit in violation of the requirements of section 501(c)(3).173 In one 
PLR, the organization was created “[t]o provide fertility services at no 
cost to married and single women who desire to have children.”174 The 
“[b]oard of [d]irectors consist[ed] of [only] two individuals[:]” a father 
and son.175 The president was the father, and the son was the 
secretary/treasurer.176 The IRS stated that the organization did “not 
serve a public purpose as required by section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii)” 
and thus could not be exempt.177 Further,
Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the regulations provides that 
an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one 
or more of the purposes…unless it serves a public rather than 
a private interest. An organization that serves a private interest 
other than incidentally, is not entitled to exemption section 
501(c)(3). Thus, although an organization’s operations may be 
deemed to be beneficial to the public, if it also serves private 
                                                      
168 Id. at 534.
169 Id. at 536.
170 Id. at 533.
171 Id.
172 See FORM 1023, supra note 83; FORM 990, supra note 83.
173 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200737044 (Sept. 14, 2007).
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interests other than incidentally[,] it is not entitled to 
exemption.178
The IRS made it clear that to qualify for exemption, the benefit to 
a private interest must be incidental and one that naturally 
accompanies the benefits to the public benefit.179 The IRS stated that 
it was “significant that M is your founder, your sole financial donor, 
and your principal sperm donor” and that, “taking into account your 
structure, governance[,] and operations, your activities result in the 
provision of more than an incidental level of private benefit to M and 
his family.”180
Other reasons for denial of exemption include the following: (1) an 
organization lacks an independent board, according to the IRS;181 (2)
two individuals are exercising “absolute control” over the 
organization;182 (3) and three directors have “unfettered control over 
[the] organization and its assets.”183 The IRS also views one-person 
boards as evidence of private benefit184 and finds that “close control 
by a few individuals without a system for public oversight[] creates an 
environment for potential abuse and insider benefit as there are no 
defined roles for responsibilities for [the] board or policies setting forth 
their duties and the handling of [the organization’s] finances.”185
The IRS goes further in ruling that an organization with a board 
composed of five individuals violates section 501(c)(3) in part because 
the entity is governed by a “small group of individuals who have 
exclusive control over the management of [the entity’s] funds and 
                                                      
178 Id.
179 Id.; Rev. Rul. 75-196, 1975-1 C.B. 155.
180 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200736037 (Sept. 7, 2007).
181 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201252021 (Dec. 28, 2012); see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200830028 (July 25, 2008).
182 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200843032 (Oct. 24, 2008).
183 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200845053 (Nov. 7, 2008).
184 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201009015 (Mar. 5, 2010).
185 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201325017 (June 21, 2013). In this PLR, the IRS held that 
petitioner did not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) as synagogue 
because it “fail[ed] the operational test and lack[ed] control and discretion 
of . . . funds.” Id. Rather, it said, “As you have been unable to document the public 
benefit of the improvements done to this facility, you have not proven your assets 
will not inure to insiders or be used to privately benefit certain individuals.” Id. The 
IRS found the following to be evidence of private benefit: (1) two board members 
were related; (2) the board “allow[ed] a non-board member, who [was] related to 
the other board members, to write checks”; and (3) the board “executed capital 
building improvements on a [privately owned] facility” with no supporting 
documentation. Id.
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operations.”186 And a large group of rulings by the IRS deal with
whether or not the boards of directors of healthcare organizations 
fulfill the requirement for community representation on the board, 
another IRS provision that is not reflected specifically in the statute.187
VI. FOR-PROFIT GOVERNANCE COMPARISON
As discussed earlier in this article, much of nonprofit law finds its 
genesis in for-profit corporate law, so a brief review of the applicable 
law seems appropriate.188 Charitable nonprofit organizations in 
colonial America began by imitating for-profit corporate law.189 For 
decades, states applied for-profit law when dealing with nonprofit 
corporate issues, and even as nonprofit corporate law grew in 
existence, much of it was fashioned on the for-profit law of the state.190
Since the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (which applies 
to publicly held for-profit corporations but was adopted by nonprofit 
organizations through the establishment of “best practices”), and the 
development of hybrid organizations, the similarities have continued. 
Further, “[t]he duties of directors of nonprofit corporations, 
particularly in recent years, have come to resemble those of directors 
of business corporations[] because of the change in function of the 
typical corporate charity.”191 Moreover, “[e]ven before adoption of 
                                                      
186 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201421022 (May 23, 2014).
187 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201436050 (Sept. 5, 2014) (denying tax 
exemption as charitable organization to health care organization partially because 
its six-member board of directors “[did] not have a majority of directors 
representing the community”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201440020 (Oct. 3, 2014) 
(denying tax exemption to health care organization, in part, because its twenty-
eight-person board (nearly all physicians) did not represent “broad interests of the 
community”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201525014 (June 19, 2015) (denying tax 
exemption to organization with one director because, in part, it “[did] not have a 
community-based board”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200828029 (July 11, 2008) 
(denying charitable tax-exempt status to organization, in part, because not operated 
by “community-based board of directors” (or because board “lack[ed] members 
who [were] representative of the community”)).
188 See supra Part III.
189 See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437 (2005). 
190 See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an 
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L. J. 617, 641–42 (1985); Kelley, supra note 189, at 
2462.
191 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ch. 3, 
topic 1, intro. note, reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). “As Bayless Manning 
observed of the basic difference between a trustee and a director: ‘the concept of 
the prudent investor was created precisely to differentiate a trustee from the wider 
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modern nonprofit-corporation statutes, courts began to apply corporate 
rather than trust standards to directors of nonprofit corporations that 
operated a complex enterprise.”192 With regard to independent board 
members, “[i]t has long been common to emphasize a distinction 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ directors, without clarifying the precise 
meaning of those terms[;]”193 also, “[a] director may have a significant 
relationship with senior executives of a corporation and still be 
disinterested with respect to a particular transaction or conduct, or may 
lack a significant relationship with the senior executives and 
nevertheless be interested with respect to the transaction or 
conduct.”194 Both of these board practices are adopted in most 
nonprofit statutes.
With regard to boards composed of related individuals or close 
friends, “[w]hat appears to be disinterested board approval may be 
disregarded by a court where the board is in fact subject to a controlling 
influence by a director who is interested in the transaction or 
conduct.”195 Nevertheless, “[i]t is not intended that a person would be 
treated as subject to a controlling influence, and therefore interested, 
solely because of a long-time friendship or other social relationship, or 
solely because of a long-time business association through service on 
the same board of directors or other relationship not involving 
pecuniary dealing.”196 When nonprofit board members are from the 
for-profit corporate world, it is not surprising that there are 
misunderstandings and violations occur.
The for-profit world has dealt extensively with the issue of excess 
                                                      
universe of business risk-taking, the very universe in which the board of directors is 
expected to live and operate.’” Id. (quoting Bayless Manning, The Business 
Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS.
LAW. 1477, 1493 (1984)).
192 Id. For a case supporting the proposition that the business judgment rule does 
not apply to breaches of the duty of loyalty, see Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l 
Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1016 (D.D.C. 
1974) (discussing instances in which defendant trustees engaged in self-dealing).
See also Summers v. Cherokee Children & Fam. Serv., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 
(Tenn. App. 2002), in which the appeals court rejected application of the business 
judgment rule in a suit by the attorney general of Tennessee to dissolve two 
nonprofit corporations whose fiduciaries were essentially looting its assets;
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT § 365 (AM. LAW INST.
2007).
193 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
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compensation, and the legal analysis is easily transportable to the 
nonprofit world.197 For example, the Ninth Circuit used a five-part test 
to determine the reasonableness of executive compensation that could 
easily be used in the tax-exempt sector.198 The five factors were as 
follows: (1) What was the employee’s role in the organization?; (2) 
How does the compensation compare to what similarly situated 
organizations pay to employees performing similar services?; (3) What 
are the character and condition of the organization?; (4) Does a conflict 
of interest exist?; and (5) Do any internal inconsistencies exist in the 
organization’s treatment of compensation payments to the employee? 
(How does this person’s compensation compare to that of other 
employees of the organization?).199 And of course, where courts are 
reviewing decisions by a nonprofit board, the business judgment rule 
is applicable.200
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The policy considerations, some of which are discussed earlier in 
this article as part of various scholars’ and practitioners’ theories 
surrounding the IRS’s authority to address governance issues, fall into 
several camps. Some believe that the IRS is undermining federalism 
and preempting state authority,201 others that the IRS is involved in 
agency overreaching,202 and yet others that dual federal agency and 
state oversight in this area is not only appropriate but effective.203
The preemption argument begins as follows:
The formal theory of federalism posits that our political system 
places limits on congressional action through states’ 
representation in Congress, and the procedural safeguards that 
function through each state’s constituency to restrain the ability 
of the federal government to reach beyond its powers. When 
congressional action threatens to infringe upon state 
sovereignty, the states’ interest in preserving the individual 
liberties of the citizens is enforced through procedural 
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal government 
                                                      
197 See Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983).
198 Id. at 1245–48.
199 Id.
200 See supra Section III.A.1.
201 See supra notes 125–139 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 148–163 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 111–124 and accompanying text.
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through state participation in federal government action.204
This representation, however, becomes more difficult when the 
powers have been delegated to administrative agencies, like the IRS. 
And while neither a Chevron analysis205 (does not apply because the 
IRS has no congressionally delegated authority here) nor Skidmore 
analysis206 (since the claim is that the regulation is not occurring 
through a legally delegated authority and not based on official duty) is 
required,207 the IRS’s initiative in the nonprofit corporate governance 
area supersedes its proper role.208
Another theory is that the IRS is regulating where it has no 
authority to do so and that, by stepping into this area through the 
“private benefit doctrine”, it has “abus[ed] its authority”209 and 
violated the law.210 Further, this claim asserts as evidence the 
statement by then-IRS Commissioner Miller in a 2007 speech 
discussing the IRS’s role in nonprofit governance: “[w]hile a few 
continue to argue that governance is outside our jurisdiction, most now 
support an active IRS that is engaged in this area.”211
Dual oversight, which supports dual sovereigns,212 has been 
trending in federalism jurisprudence and is moving “away from efforts 
to enforce mutually exclusive spheres of authority and toward 
                                                      
204 Fishman, supra note 3, at 580.
205 Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference 
applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Jacob E. Gersen,
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 218 (citing United States v. Mead, 533 US 218 (2001)).
206 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
207 Fishman, supra note 3 at 548–49.
208 Id.
209 Hopkins, supra note 3, at 4, 18.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 6 (quoting Steven T. Miller, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. Speech at 
24th Annual Georgetown University Law School Conference on Representing and 
Managing Tax-Exempt Organizations (Nov. 10, 2007)); see also IRS’ Miller 
Addresses Philanthropy Roundtable, PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CTR.,
https://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/irs-miller-addresses-philanthropy-roundtable (last 
updated May 18, 2011).
212 Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 236–37 (citing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE 
CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 26 (1995); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The 
Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8,
24–25 (Valerie A. Earle ed., 1968)).
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concurrent jurisdiction.”213 While dual oversight has benefits, some 
argue that in particular areas, most specifically the duty of care, 
regulation should be left to the states, which are better equipped to 
understand the needs of the organizations within their jurisdiction.214
VIII. CONCLUSION
IRC section 501(c)(3), the statutory section under which 
organizations are granted tax-exempt status,215 states that an 
organization must be organized and operated for charitable 
purposes,216 that it cannot allow any private inurement,217 and that it 
cannot engage in political activity.218 As discussed earlier, the 
operational test requires that a charitable nonprofit operate on a daily 
basis in keeping with its charitable mission. To do so, its board must 
oversee the operation of the organization to ensure no violations occur. 
These violations, as seen previously, can include operating for the 
private benefit of individuals or groups, through self-dealing, or 
operating in a commercial manner or in a manner not consistent with 
the organization’s mission. The board must also ensure compliance 
with the private inurement and private benefit doctrines219 so that the 
organization does not violate the requirement and maintenance 
standards of section 501(c)(3). The nonprofit is incorporated under 
state law and state statutes, which, along with the organization’s 
bylaws, set out the procedures for functioning as a board and operating 
as a nonprofit. In the application for nonprofit status, most states 
include a form that mirrors section 501(c)(3) requirements, allowing 
the nonprofit to seek federal exemption status, giving way to federal 
oversight, as well.
Because of this unique incorporation process, and the 
Congressional history briefly outlined in Part II of this Article, a great 
                                                      
213 Id. (citing Ernest Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the 
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 143–45 (2001)).
214 Mayer, supra note 8.
215 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (exempting “[c]orporations, and any community 
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or 
to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the 




219 CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, at 104–15 (discussing private inurement);
CAFARDI & CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18, at 73 (discussing private 
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deal of dual oversight has occurred over the years. What has been 
missing is coordination of these state and federal efforts, though in 
recent years greater effort has been made to encourage and facilitate 
information-sharing efforts. Moreover, while the IRS is asking more 
governance questions on Forms 1023 and 990, it cannot directly 
enforce any failure to comply unless there has been a violation of the 
law, so that coordination is not only efficient but necessary. Given 
these facts, it remains that a lack of resources still exists in this area 
(federal and state), and scandals, such as those discussed herein, are 
occurring every day in this sector. In the past, it was suggested that an 
Independent, non-governmental committee be formed to advise and 
regulate this sector, but to no avail.
One solution may be to push for more clarity from Congress and
seek more notice and comment from the IRS when it is making 
decisions that impact the sector, which may allow for better 
jurisdictional coordination. The IRS Commissioner and attorneys 
general (both political appointments) should be given clearer mandates 
regarding their roles so that decisions in this area can be made clearly 
and in accordance with statutory language. Allowing that this is largely 
a resource issue, there does not seem to be another valid way to 
regulate charitable nonprofit organizations but to involve both in this 
regulation.
